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Love: Louisiana Recent Developments

Louisiana Recent Developments
Gary H. Love
A & Roberts,
Blanchard,Waler, O'Quin
Shreveport, Louisiana

P.L.C.

I. Cases
s
A. Community Property
v.
Harvey Amoco Production Co.,
No. 96-1714 (La. App. 1st Cir. 6/20/97); 696 So. 2d 672.
This case concerned a disputed
a mineral lease entered into by plaintiff
in 1977. The mineral lease affected property purchased by the plaintiff and
s
nine relatives from plaintiffs uncle, the deed reciting that the purchasers
were acquiring with separate and paraphernal funds under separate
management and control and for their separate estates. Plaintiff husband
did not sign the deed acknowledging plaintiff declaration. Plaintiff and
her husband subsequently divorced. Both plaintiff and her former husband
executed leases affecting the property. At issue in this litigation was
whether the property was community property or the separate property of
the plaintiff. Because the husband did notjoin in the deed, the presumption
that the property was community was not rebutted conclusively by the
presence of the Adouble declaration.@ The court of appeal affirmed the
jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, holding that the plaintiff
in carried her
burden of overcoming the presumption of community by clear and
convincing evidence.
B. Dedication of Streets
State of Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development
v. Scramuzza, No. 96-1796 (La. 4/8/97); 692 So. 2d 1024.
In 1988, the State expropriated land through a number of subdivisions
which were platted and recorded, but never developed. The subdivision
streets were statutorily dedicated to St. Charles Parish. The streets were
never built and the property owners ofthe expropriated land, defendants
the expropriation suit proceedings, asserted that the land dedicated to the
parish for subdivision streets had been abandoned and reverted back to the
landowners. Supreme court holds that statutorily dedicated streets do not
revert to the adjoining landowners upon mere abandonment by the parish
and that a formal act of revocation by the parish is necessary to revoke
statutory dedication of streets under La. R.S. 48:701. La. R.S. 48:701
provides that the appropriate governing authorities may record and set aside
the dedication of roads and streets that have been abandoned or are no
longer needed.
Cantrelle v. Gaude,
97-20 (La. App. 5th Cir. 7/29/97); 700 So. 2d 523.
Landowners brought suit to establish ownership of alleyway between
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their property and the property of their neighbors. The alleyway had
previously been dedicated as a public roadway. The road was never
constructed and the Parish executed an ordinance which closed this
dedicated roadway and indicated it was not longer needed for a public
purpose. This satisfied the requirements of a formal revocation of a
statutorily dedicated roadway and failure to record the ordinance did not
render it invalid. Court found that plaintiffs acquired the entire alleyway
through ten-year acquisitive prescription but that the defendant neighbors
were entitled to a predial servitude ofpassage to the entire alleyway.
Cavaness v. Norton,
No. 96-1411 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/9/97); 694 So. 2d 1174.
Suit regarding whether a subdivision street was statutorily or impliedly
dedicated for public use. The owner ofthe property recorded a subdivision
plat showing numerous named streets and block and lot numbers. The plat
did not contain a street dedication clause. A subsequent revised plat stated
that the disputed road was dedicated to the public as a right of way only.
The court ofappeal holds that the plat initially filed substantially complied
with La. R.S. 33:5051 and that the surrounding circumstances reflected an
intent to dedicate. The court concluded that the disputed property was
statutorily dedicated to public use and that ownership ofthe road vested in
the public.
C. Gas Purchase Contracts
Louisiana Intrastate Gas Corp. v. Walsh Brothers - Gahagan, Ltd,
No. 96-1295 (La. App. 3d Cir. 3/12/9 7); 692 So. 2d 1177.

Continued litigation regarding the interpretation of pricing provisions
in a natural gas sales contract between LIG and Walsh Brothers. In this
iteration, the court of appeal reversed the decision of the trial court and
remanded the case again for trial of the issue ofwhether the parties intended
that the NGPA Section 103 pricing formula control even after Section 103
was repealed.
D. Immovables
Bayou Fleet Partnership v. Dravo Basic Materials Co.,
106 F.3d 691 (5th Cir. 1997).

Defendant was the lessee of an aggregate yard from which it stored and
sold limestone. The defendant built three stockpiles of loose limestone,
each with a foundation made from hardened limestone known as a working
base. The question in the suit was whether the defendant was entitled to
remove the limestone working bases and the stockpile limestone from the
property, or whether it was owned by a creditor of the landowner who had
seized the land and acquired it at a judicial sale.
Court holds that because of their size, degree of attachment, and
permanence, massive limestone working bases established by lessee were
"other constructions permanently attached to the ground" and therefore
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classified as immovable under Louisiana Civil Code Article 463. The loose
stockpiles were not immovables. The court held that the lessee did not
overcome the presumption that the owner of the land was the owner of the
"other constructions permanently attached to the ground," because the
lessee failed to evidence its separate ownership ofthe construction by filing
an appropriate instrument in the public records.
E. Lesion
Cook v. Mixon,
No. 29491 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/22/97); 700 So. 2d 1264, Rehearing
denied.
Plaintiffs sold 160 acre tract oftimberland to defendants in September,
1994 for $84,215. Six weeks later, the defendants received a bid from
Willamette Industries to buy the property for $192,180. Willamette
subsequently raised its bid and the defendants sold the property to
Willamette in January, 1995 for $225,934. Plaintiff brought an action
against defendants under Louisiana Civil Code Article 2594 to recover the
profit the defendants realized from the sale. The trial court held that lesion
applied and ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court of appeal reversed,
holding that even through the sale to Willamette was for over two and onehalf times the price received by the plaintiff,the plaintiff nevertheless failed
to carry her burden ofproving that the price was less than one-half of the
fair market value of the immovable sold. In reaching its conclusion, the
court of appeal noted that the trial court placed too much emphasis on the
Willamette transaction, and not having such transaction excluded from the
Amarket@ analysis. The court of appeal said this approach ignored the
Afair value@ and that for our law to provide relief under the policy for
lesion in a setting closely akin to the sale ofmovable property (for which no
lesionary remedy exists) which can be counted and priced to determine fair
market value, the plaintiff was required to establish that Willamette's bid
was accurate. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to do that and that
Willamette's appraisal and purchase were not indicative of the fair market
value of the property.
Hart v. Jack Mims, Inc.,
No. 29734 (La. App. 2d Cir. 8/20/97); 698 So. 2d 742.
Plaintiffs filed a suit to rescind a sale of immovable on grounds of
lesion. The sale occurred on November 27, 1991 and suit was filed on
November 27, 1995. At the time of the sale, Louisiana Civil Code Article
2595 provided for a four year prescriptive period for an action for lesion.
Article 2595 was amended in 1993 to provide for a one year peremptive
1, the legislature expressly provided that
period. The court ofappeal held that
the provisions ofAct 841 of 1993, including the peremption provision, were
prospective in effect and do not apply to sales executed before January
1995.

-
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F.

Partition

Connally v. Nevils,
No. 97-569 (La. App. 3d Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So. 2d 1043.
Co-owners of property brought action against the remaining owner
seeking a partition in kind of approximately 80 acres of land. The parties
stipulated that the property was capable of being divided in kind without
loss of value or inconvenience to the parties. At trial, each party proposed
different divisions of the land. The trial court initially adopted the
defendant's proposal, but
v. on a motion for new trial, adopted the plaintiffs'
proposal. The defendant appealed. The court of appeal held that the trial
court erred in failing to have experts divide the property into lots of equala
value which would then be drawn by chance by the parties.
Ivanhoe Canal Corp. Bunn,
is 1st Cir. 10/6/97); 694 So. 2d 263.
No. 95-0143 (La.App.
Co-owner brought suit for partition by licitation. Texaco, one of the
defendant co-owners, contended that property could not be partitioned
because of the provisions of Louisiana Civil Code Article 808 which
provide that property is excluded from partition when its use
indispensable for the enjoyment of another thing owned by one or more of
the co-owners. The court of appeal held that a canal located on the property
sought to be partitioned and used by Texaco in connection with its lease of
other property, located adjacent to the property sought to be partitioned,
was excluded from partition because the canal was indispensable for the
enjoyment of Texaco's lease. The canal went through the property sought
to be partitioned and gave Texaco access to other waterways where it had
oil and gas exploration and production activities. The court of appeal found
that Texaco's lease of the adjacent property was an incorporeal immovable
thing and as such Louisiana Civil Code Article 808 was applicable.
G. Peremption
Reeder North,
No. 97-0239 (La. 10/21/97); 701 So. 2d 1291.
Plaintiff brought a legal malpractice action more than three years after
the date of the alleged negligent act. The Louisiana Supreme Court holds
that in enacting La. R.S. 9:5605, the peremptive period for actions in legal
malpractice, the legislature intended that three years after the "act, omission,
or neglect," the cause of action is extinguished, regardless of when the
negligence is discovered and regardless of whether a malpractice action
may be brought within that three-year period. The court of appeal had
found that while the attorney-client relationship is in existence and the
attorney is actively attempting to remedy the alleged malpractice, until the
giving rise to the malpractice claim becomes definitive, a legal
malpractice claim does not ripen into a cause of action. The Supreme Court
disagreed because La. R.S. 9:5605 establishes a peremptive period and not
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prescriptive period and thus the "continuous representation rule" was
erroneously applied by the court of appeal.
H. Possession / Acquisitive Prescription
Bennett v. Louisiana Pacific Corporation,
No. 29,598 (La.App. 2d Cir.5/9/97); 693 So. 2d 1319, writ denied.

Plaintiff brought an action seeking damages for the wrongful cutting of
timber. The facts showed that plaintiff and defendant owned contiguous
tracts of land with both deeds describing the property as running from the
mouth of Cut-off Bayou to the center of the Section. The location of Cutoff Bayou was disputed. The court of appeal held that plaintiff acquired
ownership ofthe disputed lands by thirty year acquisitive prescription. The
disputed land had been fenced in 1939 and plaintiff's ancestors in title had
possessed to the fence for more than thirty years without interruption.
Falcone v.
Springview Country Club, Inc.,
No. 96-0794 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/2 797); 691 So. 2d 314.

Plaintiffs brought a petitory action on November 3, 1993 against
defendant claiming ownership of land upon which a golf course was
constructed. The record reflected that Nicholl Spring acquired a 76 acre
tract of land on July 10, 1948. On October 31, 1961, Nicholl Spring leased
a 56 acre parcel to the defendant, and on April 10, 1964, Spring sold the
parcel to the defendant. Both Spring and defendant apparently
a possessed,
within fenced boundaries, lands other than those described in their title.
The trial court held that the defendant established title under both ten and
thirty year acquisitive prescription. The court ofappeal affirmed, but held
that the trial court erred in holding that the defendant established title by ten
year acquisitive prescription because the parcel in question was not
sufficiently described and therefore the element of just title was not
established. The court of appeal held that the defendant established title by
thirty year acquisitive prescription because the defendant, pursuant to
Louisiana Civil Code Article 794, was entitled to tack its predecessor's
possession, notwithstanding the failure of the 1964 deed to describe the
disputed parcel. Even though defendant's 1964 deed did not sufficiently
describe parcel in question for purposes of ten year prescription, it was
sufficient juridical link to permit tacking.
CrowellLand & Mineral Corp. v. Funderburk,
No. 96-1123 (La. App. 3d Cir.3/5/79); 692 So. 2d 535. Writ not
considered

In October 1990, Crowell brought suit to be recognized as owner of
certain property possessed by the defendants. Prudum Edwards bought
certain lands in the 1930's and fenced the property purchased, together with
five and one-half acres of an adjoining tract not included in the purchase.
These five and one-half acres were the subject of the dispute. Edwards
maintained the fence and used the land as pasture until 1950. From 1950
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until 1961, Edwards did not use the property or maintain the fence. In
1961, Edwards allowed the defendants to put a camper trailer on the
disputed property and the defendants repaired the fence and pastured cattle.
The trial court held that the defendants acquired the disputed tract through
thirty years acquisitive prescription, tacking defendant's possession to that
of Edwards. The court of appeal reversed,
plaintiff
holding that there was an
interruption of
possession during the period 1950 to 1961 and that the
Plaintiff
presumption of continuous possession under Louisiana Civil Code Article
3443 had been rebutted.&Accordingly, the defendants were unable to show
possession for the requisite thirty years.
&
Atwood v. Hylan,
No. 28,971 (La.App. 2d Cir. 12/11/96); 685 So. 2d 450.
and defendant are owners of adjoining lots on Lake Claiborne.
In 1993, Atwood rebuilt and expanded a boathouse which extended over
the extended property line. In 1992, Hylan built a pier twelve feet fromv.the
property line, but at one point only four feet from Atwood's structure. The
court of appeal held that Atwood constructed his pier in good faith and was
entitled to a servitude under Louisiana Civil Code Article 670 and reversed
the trial court's order that Atwood remove part of his pier. The case was
remanded for a determination of the consideration to be paid for the
servitude.
I. Private Works Act
Hershell Corp. Fireman'sFundIns. Co.,
No. 96-1155 (La.App. 3d Cir. 3/5/97); 692 So. 2d 521.
In 1983, plaintiff filed a notice of privilege under the Private Works
Act for labor and materials supplied to a work site and filed suit naming
Greener
Sumner, a trade name of the actual owner of the property, as
defendant. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the lien was
recognized. Subsequently, the present suit was filed against the surety for
the property owner. The surety contended that because the
failed
to properly name the owner in the previous suit, the
failed to
interrupt the one year prescriptive period established by La. R.S. 9:4823.
The court of appeal held that while the prior suit did not provide third
parties notice because the suit did not correctly name the owner, the surety
was not a third party and the prior suit properly resulted in a judgment
against the owner of the property.
Cable Connector Warehouse, Inc. v. Omnimark, Inc.,
No. 96-2831 (La.App. 4 th Cir.9/12/9 7); 700 So. 2d 1273.
This case involves a suit by an unpaid supplier of a supplier for
materials ultimately used in a construction project. The action was
commenced under the Private Works Act. The unpaid supplier sold cable to
Omnimark, Inc. who then sold the cable to the cable installer subcontractor,
Sandoz Group, Inc. The prime contractor paid Sandoz, but Sandoz did not
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pay Omnimark and Omnimark did not pay the plaintiff. Sandoz and
Omnimark were owned by the same individual. The court of appeal
affirmed the trial court's grant ofa summary judgment on the ground that a
supplier to a supplier has no rights under the Private Works Act.
J. Royalty Issues
Babin v. First Energy Corp.,
No. 96-1232 (La.App. 1st Cir.3/27/97); 693 So. 2d 813.

Plaintiffs are 131 royalty and overriding royalty owners who brought
suit for underpayment of royalties. The defendants had constructed gas
processing facilities at a cost of $9.7 million and charged non-royalty
owners $0.35 to $0.60 per MMBtu to process gas. According to the
plaintiffs, actual gas processing costs ranged from $0.08 to $0.17 per
MMBtu, but defendants deducted $0.20 to $0.25 per MMBtu in calculating
royalty and overriding royalty payments. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor ofdefendants, holding that the defendants could charge
the "fair market value" of the processing services. The court of appeal
reversed, holding that the lessee may deduct for reasonable costs, but not
additional amounts for profit. According to the court of appeal, in cost
accounting terms, deduction for the fair market value of the processing is a
charge for profit.
Lewis v. Texaco Exploration Prot Co.,
No. 96-1458 (La.App. 1st Cir. 7/30/97); 698 So. 2d 1001.

Plaintiffs are mineral lessors and royalty owners who sought to bring a
class action for an accounting and royalties on take-or-pay settlements. The
court of appeal affirms trial court's certification of the class. The court of
appeal also holds that a letter written by five royalty owners, purportedly on
behalf ofthemselves and the entire class, was sufficient to constitute notice
to Texaco for the entire class under Article 137 of the Mineral Code.
Louisiana Land & Exploration Company v. Unocal Corp.,
93-1540, (E.D. La. 12/5/97); WL 756597 (Not reportedin Federal
Supplements).

Plaintiff sued for withheld extraction charges and gathering payments
collected by defendant, and royalties not collected by defendant as a result
ofa settlement reached by defendant with a gas purchaser concerning a take
or pay claim. The plaintiff and defendant were parties to a joint operating
agreement. LL&E sought a percentage of the proceeds paid to the
processor for condensate produced from the leases in question. The
processor was allowed to keep 25% of condensate extracted from gas
produced from leases. The court held that LL&E was not entitled to any
money for this claim because it had prescribed pursuant to Louisiana Civil
Code Article 3494(5). Court also held that even if not prescribed, LL&E
received its percentage of the selling price as required in the operating
agreement.

-
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Court then discussed reimbursements Unocal had received for gathering
costs actually received by Unocal from its gas purchaser. According to the
relevant provision of the joint operating agreement, the court found that the
value of the gas sold was its selling price (including premiums or
allowance). These gathering costs can be added to selling price, citing
Section 110 of the Natural Gas Policy Act (15 U.S.C. 3320) and further
such allowances are royalty bearing, citing Mesa OperatingPartnershipv.
U.S. Departmentofthe Interior,931 F. 2d 318 (5th Cir. 1991), cert denied

502 U.S. 1058, 112 S. Ct. 934, 117 L. Ed 2d 106 (1992). LL&E was
entitled to the amount held in suspense by Unocal for these reimbursed
gathering charges. These claims had not prescribed because of the
operation of the doctrine of contra non valentem.

K. Mineral Leases
Mattie Connell Caskey, et al v. Kelley Oil Company,
No. 30,278 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2/25/98); WL 78826*.

Plaintiffs, owners of a tract of land in Webster parish, granted a
mineral lease with respect to the subject property. Kelley Oil later acquired
a partial interest in the lease. Kelley improved and used a road that
a crossed
the plaintiffs tract to drill and operate a well on adjacent property not
owned by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs objected to these improvements andIn
sought injunctive relieve and damages against Kelley Oil. Kelley relied on
provisions in the lease that arguably allowed the leasee to construct roads
on property in connection with operations on any adjacent lands. The court
held Kelley failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
construction of the road conferred any benefit upon the plaintiffs.
assessing Kelly's actions, the court ofappeal relied upon the duty ofmutualin
benefit as expressed in Mineral Code Article 122. The court of appeal
reversed the trial court and rendered judgment granting plaintiffs the
injunctive relief prayed for.
L. Successions
Succession ofRivers,
No. 97-542 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/8/97); 702 So. 2d 910.

Clarence Rivers died intestate on October 29, 1981, survived by ten
children born oftwo different marriages. The decedent owned an interest
12 acres of land. The succession was judicially opened by the seven
children ofthe second marriage in 1993, and the administratrix, daughter
of the second marriage, petitioned the court for authority to sell property to
her brother. The petition was approved and the property sold, but the
description of the property in the succession, included in the sworn
descriptive list, described only one acre and not the entire twelve acre tract.
This error in the description also appeared in the petition for authority to

sell, the advertisements, the judgment authorizing the sale and the sale
itself, even though the succession representative and the buyer apparently
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intended to convey the entire tract. Suit was subsequently brought to
reform the act of sale to include the entire property. The trial court
reformed the deed. The court of appeal reversed, holding that reformation
was not available because there was no mutual error or mistake. As to the
seller (the succession), there was no error as the authorized sale was only
for one acre. The intention ofthe succession representative was irrelevant,
because the succession representative was not the seller.
Succession of Eliza Laviolette,
No. 9 7-885 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/10/97); 704 So. 2d 339.

Filing a request for Notice of Application for Appointment as
Administrator does not constitute the "judicial opening" ofa succession for
purposes of Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2893. This article
provides that no testament will be admitted to probate unless a petition
therefor has been filed in a court ofcompetent jurisdiction within five years
after the judicial opening ofthe succession ofthe deceased. La. R.S. 9:5643
provides for a five year prescriptive period on the right to probate
testaments, measured from judicial opening of succession. A judicial
opening was distinguished from opening of succession as contemplated in
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 934. To give meaning to
Louisiana Code ofCivil Procedure Article 3091, the court determined that
filing the request for notice can occur before or after succession is opened
and as such does not judicially open succession.
Succession of Becker,
No. 96-2169 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/5/97); 704 So. 2d 825.

Appeal from a judgment of the trial court requiring the widow of
decedent to furnish security to the adult children and forced heirs of
decedent. The children were from a previous marriage and not children of
the widow and decedent. Decedent left these children his separate property
which included an interest in a lease. The decedent's widow was granted
usufruct of the lease and the decedent directed in his will that the usufruct
be without bond. The court concluded that the rights of forced heirs to
compel the furnishing ofsecurity could not be derogated from by testament.
However, the court then found that the rentals from a sublease on the lease
interest were fruits ofthe usufruct ofthe lease and the forced heirs were not
entitled to security for these rental payments.
Succession ofReeves,
97-20 (La.App. 3rd Cir.10/29/97); 704 So. 2d 252.

Decedent died in 1992, with a statutory will that left approximately
one-half of his estate to his second wife and the remaining one-half of his
estate to nine of his ten children from a previous marriage. The child that
was excluded from the will filed this lawsuit to annul his father's will
alleging that the second wife exerted undue influence on the father. The
trial court held that the decedent's second wife of eleven years had exerted

-
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undue influence and nullified all bequests to her. The court of appeal held
that the trial court erred in concluding that the second wife exerted undue
influence over the testator and reversed.
The trial court relied heavily on the opinion ofa forensic psychiatrist
that supported a finding that the decedent was susceptible to undue
influence. The psychiatrist never met the testator or his second wife and
based his opinion on interviews with people who knew the decedent. The
court observed that a surviving spouse ofeleven years was not the intended
target of Louisiana Civil Code Article 1479 (voiding wills based on undue
influence). The trial court relied upon the exploitation of decedent's sexual
dependency, fear of abandonment and his need for companionship in
finding undue influence. The court of appeal suggested that love,
companionship and intimacy are the primary reasons for marriage and
called these things the "marriage imperatives." As a result, the court
specifically held that the granting or withholding of love, companionship
and intimacy, "the marriage imperatives," are matters reserved to the
married couple and shall not, standing alone, serve to invalidate a will. The
court of appeal also put much weight on the testimony ofthose who actually
knew the decedent rather than the psychiatrist who relied upon second-hand
recollections. The psychiatrist's opinion was not enough to overcome the
presumption of statutory capacity.

1

Succession ofRoniger,
No. 97-1088 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1/14/98); WL 12535*.

Decedent died on February 1, 1996 and on March 1996 decedent's
will dated December 12, 1996 was submitted for probate. Decedent's
nephew filed a petition to annul the probated testament for failure to meet
statutory requirements. Defendants filed an exception of no cause of action
and trial court maintained the exception and found the testament to be
authentic. Extrinsic evidence was allowed to clarify the date. There was
one written dissent based on the fact that the case was before the court on an
exception of no cause of action and for that reason no extrinsic evidence
should have been considered.
Succession ofHackney v. Russell,
No. 9 7-859 (La.App. 3d Cir. 2/4/98); WL 40376*.

Son of testator brought this action to contest the will. Trial court
annulled the will and named son executor. Testatrix's third husband and
testamentary executor appealed. Court of appeal considered the following
bequests:
"Second: Igive, devise and bequeath unto my husband, Paul Raymond
Hackney, the disposable portion of my interest in and to the
Community of Acquets and Gains which existed between us, subject to
the right of usufruct of, my husband, Paul Raymond Hackney, until
such time as he shall remarry or until his death..."
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The court held these bequests did not cancel each other out, but
concluded that testator intended to confer full ownership of disposable
portion ofher interest in the community to her husband and the balance of
her interest in the community property to her son, subject to the usufruct in
favor of her husband. Court of appeal said that in seeking to resolve the
ambiguity it was appropriate to consider the testimony of the notary who
prepared the will and it was also appropriate to consider language contained
in the husband's will executed on the same day the testatrix executed her
will before the same notary.
Succession ofHagelberger,
No. 96-2049 (La.App. 4th Cir.8/27/97); 700 So. 2d 226.

Decedent died without children and was never married and was
predeceased by his parents. Issue in this case was meaning ofterm "heirs"
in his olographic will. The will set forth specific legatees then left any
residual "to be equally divided between my heirs." Court held this term
indicated testator's intent to provide for those persons called by law to
inherit from him.
M. Tax sales Oliver v. Zeringue,
No. 97-329 (La.App. 3d Cir. 10/29/97); 702 So. 2d 1086.

Plaintiff brought suit to quiet title to property acquired at a tax sale.
According to stipulated facts, plaintiff acquired interests in property owned
by the defendant, Zeringue, in two separate tax sales held in 1989 and 1990.
It was stipulated that notices of the tax delinquency and the tax sales in
1989 and 1990 were sent only to Louisiana Bank and Trust Company, a
mortgage holder on the property, and that Zeringue did not receive any
a
notice. The court of appeal held that notice sent to Zeringue in care of
bank was not reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and offer them an opportunity to present their
objections. Accordingly, the tax sales were null.
McChesney v. Penn,
No. 29776 (La.App. 2d Cir.8/20/97); 698 So. 2d 705.

Plaintiff held a mortgage covering lands subsequently sold at tax sale.
Plaintiff brought suit to declare the tax sale a nullity on grounds that he was
not provided notice of the sale. The defendant argued that plaintiff was not
entitled to notice under La. R.S. 47:2180.1, which provides for notice to
mortgage holders who have notified the tax assessor and also provides that
no tax sale shall be set aside for lack of notice to a mortgagee. The court of
appeal holds that under MennoniteBoardofMissions v. Adams, 462 U.S.

791 (1983),
a mortgagee is not reasonably identifiable, constructive
notice by publication of a tax sale satisfies due process requirements. The
court held that the plaintiff was not reasonably identifiable in the mortgage
and therefore constructive notice by publication was adequate. The
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mortgage was made payable to any future holder and plaintiff was not
identified anywhere in the document. Plaintiff argued that he was named in
an assignment ofrents and leases on the subject property and this document
was filed into the mortgage records directly behind the mortgage, but the
mortgage itself did nothing to indicate the existence of the assignment of
rents and leases. The court of appeal did not reach the constitutionality of
La. R.S. 47:2180.1. See Murchisons v. Marzullio, below.
Murchisonsv. Martuio,
No. 97-815 (La.App. 3d Cir. 12/10/97); 1997 WL 75804.

Plaintiff brought suit to homologate his tax title. Trial judge dismissed
petition to homologate annulling the tax sale and court ofappeal affirmed.
Plaintiff purchased subject property at a tax sale in May, 1991. The original
property owners defaulted on the mortgage in October 1993. The
mortgagee proceeded to seize and sell the property by executory process.
Plaintiff sued mortgagor, mortgagee and purchaser of property in
foreclosure proceedings. In affirming trial court's decision, the court of
appeal held that Louisiana's statutory request notice scheme alone does not
satisfy due process requirements. The mortgagee failed to request notice
under the Louisiana statutes, but this failure was not a waiver of it's due
process rights. The court citing Mennonite stated that "a mortgagee's
knowledge of delinquency in the payment of taxes is not equivalent to
notice that a tax sale is pending...". Actual knowledge does not replace the
Mennonite requirement of notice reasonably calculated to apprise a party
with a legally protected property interest of a pending sale. The result is
that Louisiana's notice request scheme is not constitutional.
FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for New Orleans
FederalSaving andLoan Association v. Harry Lee,
96-31127 (5th Cir. 12/29/97); 130 F.3d 1139.

In the 1980s, 1-12 passed near the corner of certain real estate located
in Jefferson Parish. New Orleans Federal Savings and Loan held a
mortgage on the property. New Orleans Federal was declared insolvent in
1986 and the FSLIC was appointed receiver and later replaced by the FDIC.
The FSLIC filed a request to receive notice of foreclosure, but did not
include in its request a request for notice of any tax sale. A tax sale
occurred in 1991, and the buyer at the tax sale later inquired whether theof
FDIC was going to redeem. Apparently, the FDIC said no. More than three
years after
a tax sale the FDIC filed a writ ofmandamus to compel the Sheriff
to issue redemption deed. The state court denied and dismissed the writ
mandamus. The FDIC then filed suit in federal district court to declare the
tax sale null and void as a violation of the FDIC's constitutional due process
right to notice before the sale. Trial court declared tax sale null and void for
lack ofnotice. FDIC also argued on appeal that 12 U.S.C. 25(b)(2) requires
their consent before proceeding with tax sale. The Fifth Circuit Court
Appeals decided the case on this statutory basis rather than a constitutional

-

97

-

https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/mli_proceedings/vol45/iss1/9

12

Love: Louisiana Recent Developments

due process basis, holding that the tax sale was null and void because the
FDIC did not consent to sale.
N. Mandatory Arbitration
Sun Drilling Products Corporation v. Rayborn,
No. 97-2112, (La. App. 4' Cir., 12/3/97); 703 So. 2d 818.

Contract contained a mandatory arbitration clause subject to the
Federal Arbitration Act. Contract alleged to have been entered as a result of
"fraud in the inducement of a contact." The court held that a defense based
on the invalidity of the contract (and the binding effect of the contract) is
not subject to arbitration. Court was reluctant because ofpotential for abuse
in avoiding arbitration clauses, but nevertheless held it is the policy
of the
v.

state, as originally declared by George Engine, Co., Inc. v. Southern

ShipbuildingCorp., 350 So. 2d 881 (La. 1977), that the question of fraud in
the inducement should be resolved in court rather than through arbitration.
Court also identified an apparent conflict between Ackel Ackel, 9770, (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/28/97); 696 So. 2d 140 and Freemanv. Minolta,
29655, (La. App. 2nd Cir. 9/24/97); 699 So. 2d 1182. In Freeman the court
took the position that only fraud in the inducement ofthe arbitration clause
could be decided by the courts. This was distinguished from fraud in the
inducement of a contract generally. The Court in Ackel held that the
presence of an arbitration clause in a contract did not divest the district
court ofjurisdiction to determine the validity and legality of the underlying
contract.
TRCM, LLC v. The Twilight Partnership,
No. 30,331 (La.App. 2d
Cir.1/21/98); WL 18037*.
40373*.

TRCM alleged vices of consent in the inducement of its contract with
the defendant. Defendant Twilight argued that the contract called for
arbitration of this issue. The contract specifically required that the validity
of the contract be settled by arbitration. The court of appeal initially
affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel arbitration. On
remand from the Louisiana Supreme Court, the court ofappeal enforced the
arbitration provision, apparently relying on the specific contractual
requirement that the validity of the contract be settled by arbitration. The
court also followed the rule that arbitration provisions are enforced in this
instance unless the arbitration provision itself is based upon fraud or
misrepresentation. Compare with Sun DrillingProductsabove, indicating
an apparent conflict among the circuits.
0. Non-Competition Agreements
Henderson Implement Co., Inc. v. Langley,
9 7-1197 (La.App. 3d Cir.2/4/98); WL

Action by plaintiff seeking a restraining order against Langley for
solicitation of customers in violation of a non-competition agreement
between the parties. Defendant Langley argued that agreement was null and
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void because it sought to restrict his ability to compete with plaintiffs
affiliates as well as plaintiff and because the agreement did not define the
business ofplaintiff. Court of appeal affirmed the trial court's preliminary
injunction of Langley holding that the contract limited the area ofthe noncompete covenant to a single parish. Further, the court allowed a
reformation ofthe non-compete provisions to exclude affiliates.
Louisiana Smoked Products, Inc. v.
Savoie's
Sausage
and Food Products, Inc.,
96-1716, 96-1727 (La. 7/1/97); 696 So. 2d 1373.

The question in this case was whether a non-competition clause
contained in a manufacturing and processing agreement was null and void
under La. R.S. 23:921(A). In the contract, Savoie agreed to manufacture
and process smoked alligator and smoked venison sausage. The contract,
prepared by Savoie, contained a non-competition clause prohibiting the
parties from engaging in activities which directly competed with the other
party's business activity for a period of three years after termination of the
agreement. After termination ofthe agreement, the plaintiff claimed Savoie
breached the non-competition clause and filed this
v. suit. The Supreme Court
held La. R.S. 23:921 was inapplicable to this situation as it was not intended
to protect independent corporations on equal footing.
P. Zoning
v.
Parish of St. Charles Grimaldi Corp.,
No. 96-663 (La. App. 5th Cir. 5/28/97); 696 So. 2d 161.

Parish brought an action to enjoin the defendant from using property
zoned for residential purposes to operate a business engaged in storing
abandoned, junked, wrecked and derelict vehicles. The defendant
contended that the two year prescriptive period established under La. R.S.
9:5625(A) was applicable. The court of appeal holds that the two year
prescriptive statute for zoning use violations, as amended in 1972, does not
begin to run until the appropriate governmental agency is notified in writing
ofthe violation.
Q. Other
Plaquemines Parish Comm. Council Delta Dev. Co.,
No. 96-0270 (La. App. 4th Cir.1/29/97); 688 So. 2d 169, writ denied.

Two levee boards, the predecessors to the parish council, granted oil
and gas leases to Delta Development Company. Delta Development
Company granted subleases to Gulf Refining Company, reserving
overriding royalty interests. The parish contended that Leander Perez, Sr.,
the parish district attorney, had a conflict of interest and breached his
fiduciary duties to the levee boards in connection with his acquisition of
those overriding royalty interests. The court of appeal affirmed the trial
court's judgment that the overriding royalty interests were obtained through
a breach of fiduciary duty by Perez and that Perez's grandson, who acquired
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his interest as an heir or donee, was required to account for all sums
received attributable to those interests.

Lafayette Parish School Board, Sales Tax Division v. State of
Louisiana, through The Department ofRevenue and Taxation,

v.

97-519 (La.App. 3d Cir.10/29/97); 701 So. 2d 734.
Held that La. R.S. 47:301(3)(d), enacted by Acts 1990, No. 719, 1990
applies prospectively only. This statute deals with election of an alternative
method of computing the use tax on measurement while drilling systems.

St Charles Mortgage
&

Loan, Inc.

Oubre,

97-371 (La.App. 5th Cir. 10/15/9 7); 701 So. 2d 1020.
St. Charles Mortgage sought the reinscription of a mortgage which was
executed on April 23, 1985. St. Charles reinscribed the mortgage on
October 30, 1995 and the reinscription was cancelled by the Clerk of Court
on December 12, 1996 as untimely. The court held that in accordance with
La. R.S. 9:5161, the cancellation of the untimely reinscription was proper,
but clarified that the mortgage was still effective as between the contracting
parties.

Sudwischer v. Hoffpauir,
97-0785, (La. 12/12/97); WL 771216. Rehearingdenied.*
In this action to establish filiation, the Louisiana Supreme Court
considered whether Louisiana Civil Code Article 209 is procedural or
substantive. Louisiana Civil Code Article 209 establishes the burden of
proof in filiation cases. The court held the article was procedural and thus
retroactive.

Property Asset Management, Inc. v. Pirogue Cove Apartments,
97-0212 (La.App. 4th Cir. 4/11/97); 693 So. 2d 1217.
This case involved a suit to enforce a defaulted in rem mortgage by
ordinary proceedings. The court of appeal reversed the trial court's ruling
that in rem proceedings can only be brought against nonresidents. The
court confirmed that a mortgage is a real right and that an action to enforce
a mortgage is, in all cases, an in rem action. The court reiterated that both
ordinary and executory proceedings are in rem proceedings available to
enforce a mortgage.
II. Legislation
A. Acts 1997, No. 208 - Office of Conservation hearings
Provides that the commissioner of conservation shall implement
monthly public hearings in Shreveport, provided that funds for such
meetings are appropriated
by the legislature.
Money to fund these meetings were appropriated in Acts 1997,
Please note that these opinions have not been released for publication in the permanent law
reports and until released, are subject to revision or withdrawal.
*
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B.

Acts 1997, No. 230 - Effect of work or compliance orders
- Amended La. R.S. 30:27 to provide that a work order or
compliance order issued by the commissioner of conservation shall be
sufficient authority for the operator or persons acting on his behalf to
enter upon lands of another person, whether or not leased by the
operator, for purposes ofconducting site assessments, site restoration,
pit closure, plugging and abandonment operations, or other matters
covered by the work order.
Written notice provisions are included.

C.

Acts 1997, No. 257 - Conflict of laws - Forced Heirship

a

- Amendment of La. Civil Code Article 3533 providing that the
forced heirship law does, not apply if the deceased was domiciled
outside the state at the time of death and he left no forced heirs
domiciled in the state at the time of his death.
D.

Acts 1997, No. 261 - Mandate

- Comprehensive revision of Louisiana Civil Code Articles 2985
through 3032 relating to mandate.
in
E. Acts 1997, No. 530 - State Mineral Board
Amendment of La. R.S. 30:209 provides that the State Mineral
Board shall have the authority to enter into operating agreements
various circumstances, including when title is disputed. Act ratifies
operating agreements previously entered by the State Mineral Board.
F. Acts 1997, No. 584 - Tax sale notice
Repeals La. R.S. 9:5201, 5202 and 5203 which permitted any
person holding a mortgage to file a request for notice of each and
every tax sale and liability of the clerk for failure to comply.
G. Acts 1997, No. 818 - Inheritance and Estate Transfer Taxes
Amendment of La. R.S. 47:2401, 2431 and 2432(A) and
enactment ofLa. R.S. 47:2403(E) and 2420(D) providing, among other
things, that no inheritance tax shall be due for deaths occurring after
June 30, 2004 when judgment ofpossession is rendered or succession
is judicially opened within nine months after death. Also provides for
reductions in the rates of tax each year until 2004.
H.

Acts 1997, No. 993 - Sheriffs sale - Notice to Commissioner

Provides that prior to any sheriff s sale or public auction of "any
property related to the operation of oil and gas wells," the person
seeking such sale shall notify the commissioner of conservation ofthe
sale not less than 30 days prior to such sale. The sale shall not occur
unless the commissioner consents thereto in writing. Further provides
for a lien in favor of the commissioner and that the failure to provide
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I.

J.

K.

notice renders the person seeking the sale and the purchaser liable to
the office of conservation for the fair market value of the property at
the time of the seizure and sale.
- This act amends and reenacts La. R.S. 30:74(A)(30 and enacts La.
R.S. 30:74(a)(4).
Acts 1997, No. 1040 - Oil, Gas and Water Well Privileges
Amends oil and gas well privilege act (La. R.S. 9:4881 through
9:4889) to provide operators
a privilege over the property of non-operators to secure payment ofobligations incurred in the conduct of
-operations which the non-operator is personally bound to pay or
reimburse.
Also provides the non-operator with a privilege over the property
of the operator to secure payment of all obligations owed by the
operator from the sale or other disposition ofhydrocarbons of the nonoperator produced from the well.
Acts 1997, No. 1118 Child Support Privilege and Mortgage
Provides for effect of award for past due child support. Also
provides that an affidavit filed by the Department of Social Services
shall have the effect of a judgment which shall operate as a first lien,
privilege and legal mortgage on all movable (excluding motor
vehicles) and immovable property of the obligee from the date of
filing.
Amends and reenacts La. R.S. 13:4291 and enacts La. R.S.
46:236.10.
Acts 1997, No. 1421 - Successions

- Provides comprehensive revision ofsuccession articles, effective
July 1, 1999.
L.

Acts 1997, No. 1474 - Filing fees

Enactment of La. R.S. 9:5217 provides for uniform filing fees
charged for recording multiple indebtedness mortgage executed under
Louisiana Civil Code Article 3298.
F009)f)
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